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The respondent points out that in McGrath the Court of Appeal held that a term which
prohibited the appellant from “trespassing on any land belonging to any person whether legal
or natural within those counties” was too wide and harsh. If the appellant looks a wrong turn
on a walk and entered someone’s property, he would be at risk of a five-year prison sentence.
In our view this prohibition, albeit less open to criticism than the one in McGrath is also loo
wide and harsh. Although certain pieces of land might easily be identified as being caught by
the prohibition (such as a front garden, driveway, or path) it might be harder to recognise,
say, in more rural areas. The absence of any geographical restriction reinforces our view.
Furthermore, there is no practical way that compliance with the order could be enforced, at
least outside the appellant’s immediate home area (see para.[47] above).
The eighth order prohibited the appellant, from:
Touching or entering any unattended vehicle without the express permission of the owner.
The respondent submits:
“The appellant has previous convictions for aggravated vehicle taking and interfering with a
motor vehicle and has been reprimanded for theft of a motorcycle. It is submitted that the
prohibition is sufficiently clear and precise and is commensurate with the risk it seeks to
meet.”
We agree generally but we would have preferred a geographical limit so as to make it feasible
to enforce the order. Local officers, aware of the prohibition, would then have a useful
weapon to prevent the appellant committing vehicle crime. They would not have to wait until
he had committed a particular crime relating to vehicles,
The ninth order prohibited the appellant from:
Acting or inciting others to act in an anti-social manner, that is to say, a manner that causes or
is likely to cause harassment, alarm, or distress to one or more persons not of the same
household.
The respondent submits that this was a proper order to make and is in accordance with the
Home Office guidance. We would prefer some geographical limit, in the absence of good
reasons for having no such limit.
The tenth order prohibited the appellant from:
Congregating in groups of people in a manner causing or likely to cause any person to fear
for their safely or congregating in groups of more than six per- sons in an outdoor public
place.
PART 5 © SWEET & MAXWELL
76,
Simon Cordell’s Skeleton Argument (2) Pdf
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R. v DEAN BONES AND OTHERS
Given the appellant’s previous history the first part of the prohibition can be justified as
necessary. As the respondent points out, the final clause would appear to prohibit the
appellant from attending sporting or other outdoor events. Such a prohibition is, in our view,
disproportionate. Although, as the respondent points out, the appellant would be able to argue
that he had a reasonable excuse for attending the event, this is, in our view, an insufficient
safeguard.
The eleventh order prohibited the appellant from:
Doing anything which may cause damage.
The respondent submits that this prohibition, even if justified (which is far from clear), is far
too wide. In the words of the respondent: “Is the appellant prohibited from scuffing his
shoes?” We agree.
The twelfth order prohibited the appellant from:

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