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Lords, as section I(I){a) of the Administration of Justice Act i960 only permits an appeal
from a decision of the High Court “in any criminal cause or matter”.
Charles Garside QC and Peter Cadwallader for the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester.
Applications for anti-social behaviour orders are civil proceedings. Any proceedings for the
breach of an order are criminal proceedings. It was the intention of Parliament that
applications for antisocial behaviour orders should be civil proceedings. That result was
affected by section 1 of the 1998 Act,
Criminal proceedings are begun by arrest, charge, and production at court or by laying an
information followed by summons or warrant. Applications for anti-social behaviour orders
are begun by complaint. That is the method for commencing civil proceedings in magistrates’
courts: see Part 2 and sections 51 and 52 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. Botross v
Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council (1994) 93 LGR 268 was a case with
special facts. It concerned section 82(1) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. The Act
and that section had a long legislative history going back to 1.875. ^ ^la<^ been decided in
many cases that the nature of such proceedings was criminal, in part, because the sanctions
available included a fine. The court concluded that when Parliament enacted the r.990 Act it
had made a mistake in legislating for such proceedings to be begun by complaint and had
never intended to change the nature of such proceedings.
The procedure for applications for anti-social behaviour orders (section 1(2) of the 1.998 Act)
and sex offender orders (section 2(2) of the Act) are identical. Applications for sex offenders’
orders are civil proceedings: see B t/ Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary
1200r j r WLR 340.
106,
Simon Cordell’s Skeleton Argument (2) Pdf
[20031 I AC
59
R (McCann) v Manchester Crown Ct (HL(E)
Applying the three criteria laid down in Engel v The Netherlands (No I) I EHRR 647 to
determine whether the proceedings are “criminal” for the purposes of article 6: first, the
proceedings for anti-social behaviour orders are classified as civil in domestic law and,
second, the defendants are not charged with any offence. As to the third criterion, section 1 of
the Act is directed not to the detection, apprehension, trial and punishment of those who have
committed crimes, but the restraint of those who have committed anti-social behaviour
(which may also amount to a crime) and whose conduct is such that a measure of restraint is
necessary to protect members of the public from further anti-social behaviour. The purpose of
the proceedings is of importance within the European Jurisprudence: see Raitnondo v Italy
(1994) 18 EHRR 2.37', Guzzardi v Italy (1980) 3 EHRR 333. The powers available in those
case was at least as restrictive as chose given to the court under section 1 of the Crime and
Disorder Act 1998.
Jonathan Crow for the Secretary of State for the Horne Department. In determining whether,
as a matter of domestic classification, a particular statutory provision forms part of the
criminal law, there are two elements: (T) a “prohibited act” and (ii) “penal consequences”:
see Proprietary Articles Trade Association v Attorney General for Canada [19313! AC 310,
314. In relation to the first limb, the Act itself does not itself “prohibit” the conduct defined in
any anti-social behaviour order. In relation to the second limb, it is important to consider the
nature of an anti-social behaviour order independently from the possible consequences of any
breach. Given that the only act that can logically be said to have been “prohibited” by section
1 is the act which triggers the making of the order, it is only permissible to consider the
immediate consequences of that act—not the possible consequences of some other acts in
breach of the anti-social behaviour order, that may or may not occur in the future. When

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